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From time to time, churches, no less than other voluntary associations, experience differences in their internal affairs that may
lead to factionalism and division. Whatever the sources of friction,
members of church groups who cannot achieve harmony among
themselves must look to the courts for ultimate resolution of their
disputes.' Church controversies that are perceived to involve purely
ecclesiastical matters ordinarily are dismissed by civil courts as
beyond their competence, without inquiry into the merits. 2 Yet,
most religious altercations that culminate in litigation are at least
indirectly about the use, possession, and-control of church property.
In view of the obvious and legitimate state interest in the peaceful
resolution of property disputes, civil courts have little choice but
to assume jurisdiction in such cases, notwithstanding the fact that
the conflicts involve a church. 8 The resolution of church disputes,
however, evokes concerns not present in other types of adjudication. For inquiry into the permissible forms and limits of judicial
intervention when the matters in controversy relate to disagreements over religious doctrine and practice embraces more fundat Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. B.S.
1941, M.A. 1950, Temple University; J.D. 1947, University of Pennsylvania.
ft Law Clerk to Judge Adams. B.A. 1975, College of William and Mary;
B.A. 1977, Oxford University; J.D. 1979, University of Pennsylvania.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Brian E. Gray and Kim
J. Landsman.
I One student of this subject estimated in 1962 that approximately 25 churchproperty disputes are heard by civil courts annually. Note, Judicial Intervention
in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 1142, 1142 n.3
(1962) [hereinafter cited as HAuv. Note]. Another student has counted roughly
10 reported decisions per year from the federal courts and highest state courts.
Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional
Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113 n.1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as YAL.E
Note].
2
See, e.g., Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353, 378 (1873); accord, Schwartz v.
Jacobs, 352 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. App. 1961); Kompier v. Thegza, 213 Ind. 542, 13
N.E.2d 229 (1938).
3 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969) ("IT]he State has a legitimate
interest in resolving property disputes, and . . . a civil court is a proper forum
for that resolution.").
(1291)
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mental issues concerning the protections afforded by the first
amendment.
Standards governing judicial resolution of church-property disputes have emerged over time through a sporadic process of case.
by-case adjudication. In 1871, the Supreme Court in Watson v.
Jones 4 enunciated as a matter of federal common law a broad
doctrine of judicial deference to the internal decisionmaking unit
of a church, based upon the church's established "polity." , The
body of decisional law that developed in regard to church-property
disputes since that early adjudication thus reflects not only its
common law origin, but also the polity of the church groups concerned. In particular, most civil courts distinguished only two
broad forms of church organization-the congregational and the
hierarchical. 6 In the case of a congregational church, resolution
480 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
GThe question of "polity" is often the focus of church-property disputes. It
refers to the particular system of church government upon which church members
have agreed, including the structural allocation of authority within the church and
the established grievance procedures for resolving internal disputes. For general
discussions of the nature and forms of church polity, see J. ScHAVa, THE PoUrr
oF TE CuRtcHEs (1947); W. SPERRY, RELcioN IN AmERICA (1946); HARv. Note,
supra note 1.
6
Although courts generally have distinguished only between the hierarchical
and the congregational forms of church polity, an examination of the estimated 256
denominations and sects identified with the approximately 333,000 local churches
in the United States reveals three general types of church organizations.
A hierarchical organization has been defined by the Supreme Court as a
general organization of churches "having similar faith and doctrine with a common
ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head." Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952). At least two distinct types of hierarchical polity may be
discerned, however. Under the episcopal form of polity, all authority reposes in
certain ecclesiastical officers. In a presbyterial arrangement, authority is delegated
instead to an ascending succession of judicatories composed of laymen as well as
ministers. Unlike episcopal polities, presbyterial churches are representative, inasmuch as both ruling "elders" and ministers constituting the governing bodies are
elected by the congregation. Among the principal denominations with an episcopal
form of polity are the Protestant Episcopal Church, the Methodist Church, the
Roman Catholic Church, and the Eastern Orthodox Churches. Those churches
classified as having a presbyterial form of polity include the United Presbyterian
Church of North America, the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and the
Assemblies of God.
In contrast to the hierarchical form of organization, the central characteristic
of a congregational polity is the autonomy of each local entity. While congregational churches sometimes affiliate with other religious organizations, they
generally recognize no superior authority over the local congregation. Subject to
the rules prescribed for its own self-government, a congregational church is free
to affiliate and withdraw from other church organizations at will. Examples of a
congregational polity are provided by the numerous Baptist bodies, the Jewish
congregations, the Church of Christ, and the Quakers.
Although the polities of most denominations may be characterized as either
episcopal, presbyterial, or congregational, such classifications are merely approximations drawn from the most typical of a great variety of organizational patterns
among religious associations, many of which differ in significant respects from the
standard forms of government and some of which defy classification altogether.
See generally W. SPERRY, supra note 5, at 283-84.
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of the dispute was determined according to the rules governing
ordinary voluntary associations. Courts generally deferred to a
determination reached by officers vested with control of the property; in the absence of clear title, the decision reached by a majority
of the congregation was held to be conclusive. If the polity of the
church was hierarchical, however, courts deferred instead to the
solution provided by the highest church tribunal of the central
organization that had addressed the conflict. This approach
rendered resolution of church-property disputes conceptually
simple; indeed, in many cases ascertainment of the church's polity
became the determinative inquiry.
The doctrine of judicial deference enunciated in Watson was
grounded in a general reluctance to interfere with the internal
affairs of private associations. At least in part, it rested on the
belief that religious societies should be treated equally with other
voluntary associations. 7 Judicial reluctance to intrude in the
affairs of religious associations also was influenced to some extent
by a self-perceived lack of competence in matters of religious doctrine and practice.8 Quite apart from its roots in associational
freedom and institutional competence, however, the doctrine of
deference represented an attempt on the part of the judiciary to
further the basic ideals of religious liberty and autonomy through
the separation of church and state.9 Although not a constitutional
decision,' 0 the "rule of action" set forth in Watson was said to be
"founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and
state under our system of laws." 11
7

See notes 42-48 infra & accompanying text.
To allow civil-court review of church decisions, the Supreme Court stated in
Watson, would in effect permit an appeal "from the more learned tribunal in the
law which should decide the case, to the one which is less so." 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 729. See notes 193-94 infra & accompanying text.
980 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729. See L. ThME, AsvmnicRAs CONsTrruTioNAL LAW
§ 14-12, at 877 (1978) ("[T]he doctrine represents a recognition of the[ ]
necessary separation [of religious bodies] from governmental entanglement, a separation designed as much to protect the state as to defend the church."); Kauper,
Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969
Sup. CT. REy. 347, 353; Note, The Role of Civil Courts in Church Disputes, 1977
Wxs. L. REv. 904, 910 [hereinafter cited as Wis. Note].
10 Inasmuch as Watson was decided prior to Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), the federal courts were still applying federal common law on the
basis of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Moreover, the religion
clauses of the first amendment had not yet been applied to the states. The first
decisions to do so were Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free
exercise), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment).
1180 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727, quoted in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 113 (1952).
8
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In the apparent belief that a "wall of separation" between
church and state was necessary to maintain those relations, Watson
sought to promote "a spirit of freedom for religious organizations"
by respecting their right to decide for themselves matters of internal
concern, free from state interference. 12 As a means of maintaining
this separation, Watson attempted to avoid judicial involvement in
doctrinal clashes by assuming that all members of hierarchical organizations implicitly submit themselves to the decisionmaking
authority of the church in ecclesiastical and property matters. 13
Judicial willingness to defer to the determinations of hierarchicalchurch tribunals thus afforded hierarchical associations great
autonomy in conducting their affairs. Although subsequent opinions exhibited concern in this regard and suggested exceptions to
the nonintervention doctrine in cases of "fraud, collusion or arbitrariness," 1 the principle of judicial deference in the main
retained its vitality. After the limitations of the first amendment
became applicable to the states, 15 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the deference principle and implied that it had constitutional status
under the free exercise clause. 16
If the rival parties to a dispute over church property are at
least agreed that power to prescribe use of the property has been
delegated to a body within the hierarchy of the church, application of the deference doctrine operates reasonably well. The major
difficulties occasioned by this approach, once the hierarchical association has been ascertained, 1 7 are the identification of the authoritative decisionmaking body within the hierarchy and the determination of what that body has decided.' 8 When the fundamental point
of contention is which of two competing local factions in fact
possesses authority over the contested property, however, unbounded
deference to a hierarchical body's determination of that question
poses serious problems. In this situation, judicial reluctance to
evaluate the merits of the litigants' respective claims not only appears to deprive local church groups of the same protection afforded
'2Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
13 See notes 50-52 infra & accompanying text.
14 See notes 53-61 infra & accompanying text.
-15 See note 10 supra.
26Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
17 Watson v. Jones offered no criteria for making the crucial and often difficult
decision whether the denomination in question is congregational or hierarchical.
See IARv. Note, supra note 1, at 1153-60. As we shall discuss, judicial determination of church polity itself raises concerns involving the religion clauses of the
first amendment. See notes 195-97 infra & accompanying text.
18 See generally HAIIv. Note, supra note 1, at 1158-67.

19801

J[ONES v. WOLF

1295

members of other voluntary associations, but also raises the presentiment of judicial establishment of religion.
That judicial intervention in church-property disputes implicates the establishment clause as well as the free exercise clause
was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1969. In a persuasive dictum, the Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull MemorialPresbyterianChurch 19 introduced the concept
of "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property
disputes" 20 with the salutory instruction that such principles "can
be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is
awarded." 21 While the Court's opinion neither defined nor elaborated on the meaning of "neutral principles," it indicated that,
consistent with the religion clauses of the first amendment, churches
could be subject to the same law that governed other voluntary
associations-traditional contract, property, and trust law.
The summary invocation of "neutral principles" in Presbyterian Church unsettled a century of doctrinal development and
injected considerable confusion into the law concerning the proper
application of these principles and the nature of their relation to
the role of judicial deference. Judicial deference to a hierarchical
organization's decisionmaking organ is not a rule generally applicable to property disputes, except insofar as it may be called
"deference" if that body has been able to place legal title where it
wants. As a result, commentators read the Court's opinion as both
a rejection of the deference doctrine and an indication that henceforth religious groups would be treated on a plane with other
voluntary associations. 22 Given such expectations, the Supreme
Court's next major pronouncement eight years later in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivoievich 23 served only to confound commentators further. There, the Court indicated that, in
certain circumstances, decisions by authoritative church tribunals
concerning issues of internal administration and polity, as well as
matters of faith and discipline, bind civil courts. To many, Serbian's holding signaled the demise of the neutral-principles approach to adjudicating disputes involving hierarchical churches. 24
At the very least, Serbian seemed to circumscribe severely the role
of civil courts in intrachurch conflicts.
19393
20 Id.

U.S. 440 (1969).
449.

21 Id.
22

See notes 77-78 supra &accompanying text

23426 U.S. 696 (1976).
24 See notes 88, 94 & 95 infra & accompanying text.
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Judicial confusion and uncertainty concerning the vitality of
neutral principles and the limits of the deference doctrine after
Serbian contributed to a series of conflicting decisions and a resulting lack of uniformity among state courts in this area. While
some courts believed themselves constitutionally bound to yield in
all cases to a hierarchical tribunal's determination, 25 others thought
that the first amendment mandated deference only when a dispute
was not susceptible to resolution through neutral principles of
law. 28
Perhaps with a view to these concerns, the Supreme Court
in Jones v. Wolf,27 a five-four decision 28 handed down at the end
of the 1978 Term, attempted to delineate more precisely both
the nature and significance of neutral principles as well as the
limits of authorized judicial review of church-property disputes.
Jones v. Wolf represents an express endorsement of the neutralprinciples method of adjudicating such disputes. At the same
time, however, the opinion of the Court indicates that the doctrine
of judicial deference to a hierarchical organization's internal authority remains a constitutionally acceptable, alternative mode of
decision. By approving these seemingly contradictory approaches,
Jones v. Wolf appears to leave state courts free either to treat hierarchical churches as any other voluntary association or to accord
them preferential treatment by deferring to the resolution reached
by the chosen body of the hierarchy.
In view of the efforts exerted by both the majority and the
dissent to define the principles governing prior opinions, Jones v.
Wolf is bound to become the focus of much future debate. Its
appearance thus makes it appropriate to review once again the
doctrinal development of the law in prior Supreme Court decisions.
An examination of prior opinions-distinguishing the particular
contexts and considerations involved in those decisions-may provide some understanding of the inherent tension in the body of
law pertaining to church-property disputes.
This apparent tension has recently been explained as a manifestation of the "irreconcilable conflict" between religious community, which is furthered by judicial nonintervention in church
disputes, and religious autonomy, which may be compromised if
25 See note 115 infra.
26
See note 116 infra.

27443 U.S. 595 (1979).
28 Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Mr. Justice Powell wrote the
dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White.
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such nonintervention subjects dissident church groups to "un29
It
bounded domination by oppressive religious authorities."
has also been observed that the difficulties in resolving church quarrels stem from the more fundamental problem of reconciling the
parallel protections of the free exercise and nonestablishment provisions of the first amendment. This is said to be so because "each
party to an intrachurch dispute can lay claim to the protections
offered by one of the religious clauses." 80
This Article suggests, to the contrary, that at least in the area
of church disputes over property, the two religion clauses each
work to the same end. Relying on the conception that "the religion clauses were not separate mandates but a single one and that
the underlying proposition was assurance of equality of treatment," 81 it proposes that "neutral principles of law" constitute not
merely a permissible but the constitutionally required mode for
resolving church-property disputes. Although based on a belief
that religious liberty will be furthered by a separation of church
and state, judicial deference to a hierarchical church's internal authority, when premised upon the assumption that members of a
competing group voluntarily have submitted their property to the
control of that authority, places the imprimatur of secular authority
behind a particular form of religious organization-thereby implicating the establishment clause. At the same time, it also interferes with the freedom of individuals and groups to associate on
their own terms for religious purposes.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINE
A. Watson v. Jones: Churches as Voluntary Associations
The seminal Supreme Court decision concerning judicial re2 decided
view of disputes over church property is Watson v. Jones,3
in 1871. Watson dealt with a struggle between two rival factions
of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky,
for control of the church premises. Organized about 1842 under
the authority and as part of the Presbyterian Church of the United
States, the Walnut Street Church in 1853 purchased a parcel of real
estate in Louisville, the title to which was conveyed to the trustees
of the local church. The deed to the property as well as the charter
29 L. TmIBE, supra note 9, § 14-12, at 880.

8o Wis. Note, supra note 9, at 925.
81 Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VmxL. L. REv. 3, 24 (1978-79).
8280 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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of the local church, however, "subjected both property and trustees
alike to the operation [of the general church's] fundamental
laws." I' According to these laws, the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church of the United States possessed "the power of
deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline." 84
In 1865, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that required members of the congregation who adhered to the concept of
the divine character of slavery to "repent and forsake these sins." 35
Contending that this resolution was contrary to a provision in the
constitution of the Presbyterian Church, the minority faction of
the local congregation seized control of the church property and
severed its affiliation with the Presbyterian Church. The General
Assembly responded by excluding the pro-slavery minority from
any affiliation with the general church and by declaring the antislavery faction to be the true and lawful Walnut Street Church.86
After unsuccessful litigation in the state courts,3 7 representa-

tives of the antislavery, majority faction instituted a diversity suit
in federal court. 8s The circuit court sustained the majority's claim
for injunctive relief, which assured its control of the property, and
the minority faction appealed to the Supreme Court. There, the
dissidents, maintaining that the local church property was held for
the use of the local church congregation subject to an implied
trust in favor of the doctrine to which the property was devoted,,
urged the Court to invoke the "implied trust" and "departurea8 Id. 683.
gregation. Id.

The trustees were to be selected by the members of the con-

-3 Id. 682.
35
As a result of the dispute over slavery, the Presbytery of Louisville, possessing immediate jurisdiction over the Walnut Street Church, adopted "A Declaration
and Testimony against the erroneous and heretical doctrines and practices which
have obtained and been propagated in the Presbyterian Church of the United
States during the last five years" in which it condemned "the usurpation of
authority" by the General Assembly. Id. 691 (emphasis in original).
In the main, religious schisms in the United States have been occasioned by
economic and political differences, rather than by theological or ecclesiastical disagreements. The issue of slavery was particularly divisive of religious associations.
W. SPERRY, supra note 5, at 77; W. SPmmr, RELIGioN AND Out DVIDED
DENOMnITIONS (1945).
3880 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 692.

The Kentucky court held
87 Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1867).
that a General Assembly decision was ultra vires under the church constitution, and
ruled in favor of the pro-slavery minority.
8 The suit was brought by three petitioners who lived across the state line
in Indiana. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 694. The Court denied that the Kentucky
court's judgments were res judicata because the state court was concerned merely
with the legitimacy of the defendants' election as elders. Id. 715-17.
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from-doctrine" standard.3 9 On this theory, control over property
contributed to a church is based on adherence to the fundamental
tenets in effect at the time the contribution was made. The antislavery position taken by the general Presbyterian Church, the
minority faction claimed, constituted a departure from traditional
doctrine in contravention of the avowed purposes of the alleged
trust. The majority faction thus was said to have forfeited its control over the property when it followed the general church and
repudiated the original, pro-slavery doctrine. As the local faction
adhering to and maintaining the original church tenets, the minority maintained that it was entitled to control the property.
Mr. Justice Miller, writing for the Court, refused either to
imply a trust in favor of the adherents to original church doctrine
or to apply the departure-from-doctrine standard advocated by
them. Inasmuch as the approach espoused by the dissidents would
require civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions concerning
"the true standard of faith in the church organization, and which
of the contending positions before the court holds to this standard," 4 0 Mr. Justice Miller found it incompatible with "the full and
free right to entertain any religious belief" 41 enjoyed in this
country. Instead, he professed to promote the freedom of all religious groups by treating them equally with other voluntary associations. "Religious organizations," he declared, "come before us
in the same attitude as other voluntary associations . . . and their
rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection
of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its

restraints."

4

The underlying rationale for the Court's opinion thus was
contractual. 43 Individuals or groups may affiliate themselves for
39
The "implied trust" and "departure-from-doctrine" standard is of English
origin and apparently was first articulated by Lord Eldon in Craigdallie v. Aikiman,
3 Eng. Rep. 601, 606 (H.L. 1813). Lord Eldon ruled in favor of a minority
religious body's withdrawal from the established Church of Scotland because the
latter had deviated from the doctrine set forth by the founders of the church.
For discussions of the English origins of the implied trust and departure-fromdoctrine standard, see Kauper, supra note 9, at 349-56; Hanv. Note, supra note 1,
at 1145-49.
40 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. The Court also rejected the petitioners' contion that the church property in dispute was in fact devoted to the support of a
specific body and doctrine. It maintained instead that this property was "acquired
. . . for the general use of a religious congregation" connected with a general
church organization "by religious views and ecclesiastical government." Id. 726.
41 Id. 728.

42 Id. 714.
43

See generally Wis. Note, supra note 9, at 909-13.
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religious purposes with any other individuals or groups they
choose-apparently, on any terms-without interference from the
courts. When an individual or group enters into a legitimate
agreement, however, the courts will not justify failure to perform
as agreed on grounds of religious freedom. Consistent with this
approach, the Court enunciated the general principle that in disputes over property acquired for the use of a religious congregation, the group "ascertained to be that congregation, or its regular
and legitimate successor,
property." 4

.

.

. is entitled to the use of the

Application of the contractual approach was intended to vary
with the nature of the property conflict. In particular, Mr. Justice
Miller distinguished three categories of disputes. The first involves
property subject to an express trust dedicating the property to the
support of a specific doctrine. 45 The second concerns disputes
involving what he termed "strictly independent" congregations. 46
The third category encompasses disputes in hierarchical churches
which arise "where the religious congregation.., holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a
general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in
some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization."

47

Only in the case of a strictly congregational or independent
church would a property dispute be resolved according to "the
ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations." 48 Absent
44 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 726.

45 Id.722. Property disputes in which there had been an express dedication for
a particular purpose presented no problems of adjudication to the Watson Court.
The rules of construction generally applicable to charitable trusts seemed "equally
applicable to ecclesiastical matters." Id. 723; see also note 72 infra.
46 Id.722.
47 Id.722-23 (emphasis added).
48 Id. 725. Justice Miller's statement of the rule applicable to congregational
churches is consistent with the neutral-principles approach set forth in this Article.
Because it uses principles derived from the law governing voluntary associations,
it treats religious groups in a manner equivalent to all other private organizations.
It requires no inquiry into doctrine.
This approach had been used prior to Watson v. Jones for resolution of congregational disputes. The problems with this approach were, however, part of the
reason for adherence to the implied-trust doctrine. The implied-trust doctrine was
applied to prevent "manipulation by a shifting and impermanent temporal majority
[which would] cause a deviation from established doctrine." Kauper, supra note
9, at 355. Thus, invalidation of the implied-trust doctrine and its correlative
departure-from-doctrine standard may have invited greater denominational instability among congregational churches. The effect of Watson on congregational
churches is discussed at length in Casad, The Establishment Clause and the
Ecumenical Movement, 62 MIcH. L. BMv. 419 (1964).
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any designated tribunal or officers instituted by the congregation
for purposes of ecclesiastical government, the congregation's majority would control the right to use the property. In contrast,
the Court's opinion did not require, indeed it prohibited, an examination into the form of government adopted by a local congregation upon association with a hierarchical church. Rather, civil
courts were to ascertain the legitimate successor to church property
in a hierarchical dispute by determining which group is so recognized by the highest church judicatory and by deferring to that
finding. "All who unite themselves to such a body," wrote Mr.
Justice Miller, "do so with an implied consent to this government,
and are bound to submit to it." 49 Accordingly, "the rule of action
which should govern the civil courts" was that "whenever the
questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest . . . church judicator[y]
. . . , the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and

as binding on them." 5 0 Watson v. Jones thus rejected the impliedtrust theory which bound the general church to a particular doctrine and replaced it with an implied-consent theory which conjoined the local church to the general church in all matters.
Application of the approach set forth in Watson v. Jones for
the resolution of church-property disputes posed few difficulties. 51
Once civil courts found implied consent on the part of a local
church to be bound to a general church organization, the crucial
determination then became the characterization of the church
polity as either congregational or hierarchical. When a church's
organizational structure was ascertained to be hierarchical, the
action or judgment of the highest church tribunal was conclusive
on the civil court.5 2
B. Qualifications to Deference Doctrine
The deference doctrine enunciated in Watson v. Jones, if
strictly applied in conjunction with the principle of implied consent, would allow a hierarchical church judicatory almost un4980 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729.
50 Id. 727.
51

See generally Wis. Note, supra note 9, at 910.

52 That Watson v. Jones resulted in this pattern in the state courts is ironic.

As it was admitted in Watson that the local church had bound itself and its
property to the general church's control, the principle of implied consent was
unnecessary to the decision in that case. See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
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limited authority over its associated churches.5 3 Subsequent decisions, reflecting this concern, defined certain limited exceptions
to the Watson rule and imposed on church tribunals minimal fairness requirements.
Bouldin v. Alexander,54 decided one year after Watson, dealt
with a property dispute between competing factions of a congregational church, both of which claimed to represent the church. In
a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court endorsed judicial inquiry
into the structure of a church's organization for the purpose of
determining which of the two groups actually represented the ultimate authority within the church. Some years later in Brundage
5
v. Deardorf,5
Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft refused to extend
Watson's deference rule to similar actions taken by the judicatory
of a hierarchical church that were perpetrated "in fraud of the
rights of a minority seeking to maintain the integrity of the
original compact" 16 under which the affiliation was established.
Judge Taft conceded that under Watson civil courts generally may
not interfere with the right of a church's governing body to construe the limitations of its own power, but instead must accept
such determinations as conclusive.
He insisted, however, that
Watson did not apply to an "open, flagrant, avowed violation" 57
of the contract under which church property became vested in the
hierarchical organization.
"Certainly, the effect of Watson v.
Jones," he wrote, "cannot be extended beyond the principle that a
bona fide decision of the fundamental law of the church must be
recognized as conclusive by civil courts." 58
In Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,59 the
Supreme Court, in a dictum written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, not
53 Permitting

civil-court inquiry

into the

construction and

application

of

church law by authoritative church tribunals, stated Mr. Justice Miller, "would, in
effect, transfer to the civil courts where property rights were concerned the decision
of all ecclesiastical questions." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 734. "It is of the essence
of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision
of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in
all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance." Id. 729. Having agreed to abide by the
determination of the hierarchical-church tribunal, neither party should have

recourse to review of such decisions by a civil court.
5482 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
5555 F. 839 (N.D. Ohio 1893), rev'd, 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899). The
reversal by the circuit court was based on a different construction of the facts
in the case.

56 Id. 847-48.
57 Id. 846.
5s id. 847.
59 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
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only endorsed Judge Taft's modification of Watson, but extended
it to include actions of church tribunals that were either collusive
or arbitrary. In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness,
however, civil courts must accept as conclusive church court determinations of ecclesiastical matters.60 These decisions, although
qualifying Watson, steadfastly adhered to its contractual rationale.
Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis explicitly justified civil-court deference
to decisions of proper church tribunals on the ground that the
parties in interest had agreed to accept their determinations as conclusive, "by contract or otherwise." 61
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATION OF CHURCH-PROPERTY

DISPUTES
A. The Deference Doctrine
62
After the first amendment was held applicable to the states,
the deference rule delineated in Watson v. Jones,6 3 was transformed
from a common-law precept to a constitutional principle. Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral6 was the first case that explicitly
grounded the deference rule in the free exercise clause. At issue
in Kedroff was the constitutionality of a New York statute that
sought to transfer administrative control over the Russian Orthodox churches of New York from the central governing hierarchy
of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow to the governing authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church in America. In the

Court's view, resolution of the property question depended on
which church organization had the power to appoint the prelate
of the New York diocese. 5 Invoking the Watson doctrine of deference to decisions of authoritative hierarchical-church tribunals, the
Court determined that, because the central governing hierarchy had
the right to appoint the Bishop of the Archdiocese of North America, New York's statute constituted an infringement of the general
church's free-exercise right under the first amendment. "Freedom
to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are
proven," the Court concluded, "must now be said to have federal
60 Id. 16.
61 Id.
62 See note 10 supra.

8380 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
64344 U.S. 94 (1952).
supra note 1.
65 344 U.S. at 96-97.

For a critical analysis of Kedroff, see YALE Note,
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constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of religion
against state interference." 16
The Supreme Court's decision in Kedroff thus reaffirmed the
Watson deference rule and indeed accorded it constitutional status
under the free exercise clause. Decisions of authoritative hierarchical-church tribunals concerning ecclesiastical matters, when
exercised pursuant to the consent of member churches, must be
accepted as conclusive by civil courts unless fraudulent, collusive,
or arbitrary. The Court did not explicitly address, however, the
propriety of Watson's dictum that local churches, by affiliating
themselves with a hierarchical church, may be held to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the ecclesiastical authority of the
general church with respect to all matters.6 7 To the contrary, the
Court in Kedroff prefaced its discussion of Watson by pointing
out that the earlier decision was based not merely upon the hierarchical nature of the organization in question, but also on the
fact that the local church, its property, and its officers were subject
to the control of the general church.
Similarly, the Court in Kedroff premised its decision on the
finding that the Russian Orthodox Church held administrative
control over the North American diocese, including the power to
appoint all clergy. 68 This suggests that the Kedroff Court's elevation of the deference doctrine to constitutional status was not meant
to extend similar status to Watson's implied-consent dictum. Such
a conclusion is buttressed by a footnote in which the Court stated
that the principle of judicial "nonreviewability" is justifiable only
"when [it is] within the 'express or implied stipulations' of the
agreement of membership." 69
66 Id. 116. Kedroif's holding invalidating this legislative action was extended
to judicial action in Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
In K-reshik the Court reversed a New York state court judgment that transferred

control of Saint Nicholas Cathedral from the central governing authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church to the Russian Church of America. See also Presbyterian

Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
448-49 (1969).
67The Court expressly noted: "The opinion of this Court [in Watson] assumed
without question that the Louisville church, its property and its officers were

originally and up to the beginning of the disagreements subjected to the operation
of the laws of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church." 344 U.S. at 111.
68 Id.105-06.
69 Id. 115 n.20 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733). Mr.
Justice Reed recognized the "vivid and strong criticism" of Watson's statement that
civil courts may not examine a church-court conclusion as to "'a subject-matter
of dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character."' Id. See C. ZoLr.u~,
Asms

c.AN CurmcH LAw 291 (1933).
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B. UnconstitutionalJudicial Inquiry: The Implied Trust and
Departure-from-DoctrineStandard
Despite the express disapproval in Watson v. Jones of an implied-trust theory based on adherence to church doctrine, many
state courts continued to apply variations of that rule as a matter
of state common law.7 0 In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,71 the Supreme Court
finally gave definitive consideration to the constitutional validity
of the implied-trust theory and its correlative departure-from-doctrine standard. Presbyterian Church presented a hierarchicalchurch dispute between a general church and two of its local member churches over the right to use and control the local churches'
property. The controversy began when the local churches claimed
that the general church had violated the organization's constitution
and had departed from accepted doctrine and practice. At the
time, Georgia law implied a trust of local church property for the
benefit of the general church on the condition that the general
church adhere to doctrinal tenets existing at the time of affiliation
of the local churches. On the basis of a jury finding that the general church had substantially abandoned its original doctrines, the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the right of the local congregations to withdraw from general-church organization and to retain
control of their property.
The Supreme Court, holding that such civil-court inquiry
into church doctrine violated the first amendment, reversed the
state court. Because questions of doctrine and practice are matters
of purely ecclesiastical concern, the Court reasoned, civil-court
inquiry into such questions under the departure-from-doctrine
standard is constitutionally impermissible. The Court concluded
that "the departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied
trust theory can play no role in any future judicial proceedings.
The departure-from-doctrine approach is not susceptible of the
marginal judicial involvement contemplated in Gonzalez [v. Roman
CatholicArchbishop of Manila]." 72
70

See generally Casad, Church Property Litigation: A Comment on the Hull

Church Case, 39 GEo. WAS.
71393 U.S. 440 (1969).

L. REv. 44, 56 (1970).

72 Id. 450 (emphasis in original). In a footnote to this statement the Court
expressly left open the question of "the precise limits of review for 'fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness' within the meaning of Gonzalez." Id. 450 n.7. See notes 59-61
supra & accompanying text.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that he did not "read the
Court's opinion to go further to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
civilian courts from enforcing a deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down
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Apart from invalidating the departure-from-doctrine approach,
the Court in Presbyterian Church was content to remand the case
to the state court with a general admonition that church-property
conflicts be decided "without resolving underlying controversies
over religious doctrine." 73 Despite its apparent endorsement of the
Watson deference doctrine, however, the Supreme Court did not
recommend to the state court that it yield to the determination of
the pertinent governing church body. Instead, the Court emphasized that, although the first amendment "severely circumscribes"
the nature of permissible judicial intervention in disputes over
church property, "not every civil court decision as to property
claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by
the first amendment." 74 In particular, the Court instructed that
"neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes" 75 can be applied by civil courts to adjudicate these controversies. The Court then assigned to both the states and the
churches themselves the responsibility for ordering the use and control of church property in ways that would obviate the need for
76
civil-court inquiry into ecclesiastical questions.
C. Neutral Principles Applied: Sharpsburg
The Court's opinion in Presbyterian Church offered no guidance regarding the determination or application of neutral principles and failed to explain the correlation, if any, between the
neutral-principles approach and the deference rule of Watson v.
Jones. To some observers, the Court's endorsement of neutralprinciples excluded Watson's doctrine of judicial deference to
church authority "as a rule not 'developed for use in all property
disputes.' "77 Others viewed the language of the Court's opinion,
conditions limiting a religious organization's use of the property which is granted."
393 U.S. at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
73Id. 449.
74

Id.

75 Id.
76 Id. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that because Georgia
chose to adopt the implied-trust theory with the departure-from-doctrine element
as a condition, "it would not have adopted the theory without" the departurefrom-doctrine element. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian
Church, 225 Ga. 259, 260, 167 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1041 (1970).
Finding no other basis for a trust of the local church property for the general
church in either the language of the deeds or in the constitution of the general
church, the court rendered judgment in favor of the respective local churches.
77See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 -Anv. L. REv. 7, 129 (1969)
(quoting in part Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449).
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if not its substance, as indicating that churches would in the future
be treated "like any other voluntary association." 7,
Maryland and Virginia Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,79 decided the following term, provided the Supreme
Court with an occasion to recognize and approve an appropriate
application of "neutral principles of law" to a church-property
dispute. In Sharpsburg, majorities in two individual congregations of the Church of God separately purported to withdraw themselves and their property from association with the Maryland and
Virginia Eldership of the Church. Refusing to recognize the withdrawal, the eldership issued a judgment which declared that the
local minorities in each church group constituted the "true congregation" and therefore retained all property rights in the local
churches. s0 The eldership subsequently brought suit against the
secessionist congregations, seeking to prevent their withdrawals
and asking that the minority factions be adjudged the rightful
owners of the local church property. Sharpsburg was pending
before the Supreme Court when the opinion in Presbyterian
Church was announced, and accordingly was remanded for further
consideration in light of that ruling. On remand, the Maryland
Court of Appeals reviewed its previous decision and concluded
that it had anticipated Presbyterian Church and properly applied
the neutral-principles approach subsequently invoked in that
decision.
While noting the importance of the question of church polity
in considering church-property disputes, the Maryland court had
pointed out in its initial opinion that "merely because a denomination has some of the characteristics of one type of polity, some of
the characteristics of other polities are not excluded." 81 Although
the court recognized several methods by which general churches
may secure control over the property of associated local churches,82
78

See e.g., Kauper, supra note 9, at 375 (footnote omitted).

79249 Md. 650, 241 A.2d 691 (1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528,
reaff'd, 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
s0 As the Maryland court noted, the judgment of the General Eldership dedared "that all persons who voted to withdraw from the Md. & Va. Eldership
have: '. . . abandoned and forfeited all rights, privileges, properties and offices in
the local church and in the Churches of God. . . . In each local church the
members who continue to adhere and submit to the doctrines and the policy of the
denomination constitute the true congregation."' 249 Md. at 655, 241 A.2d
at 694.
81249 Md. at 664, 241 A.2d at 698-99.
82 The Court explicitly defined three methods by which a hierarchical denomination may maintain control of local church property:
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it insisted that the mere fact of some hierarchical connection with
a general church does not preclude that local church from retaining
its right as a congregation to use and control local church property.
After examining the applicable state statutes governing the holding
of church property, the terms of the instrument deeding the property to the local churches, and the pertinent provisions of the general-church constitution and the local-church charters, the Maryland court concluded that the majority factions, consistent with the
first amendment, could withdraw from the general organization and
retain control over the properties of the respective local churches.
In its decision on remand, the court noted that the implied trust
and departure-from-doctrine standard were never part of Maryland's law, and claimed that it therefore was "required by
the existing Maryland law as well as by the command of Hull
[Presbyterian Church] to decide the present case upon neutral
principles of law." 83 The court then exhaustively examined its
earlier decision, and held that it was strictly in accord with the
neutral-principles approach approved in Presbyterian Church.84
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed an
appeal from the decision of the Maryland court for lack of a substantial federal question.8 5 Dismissal was warranted, the Court
explained, because "the Maryland court's resolution of the dispute
involved no inquiry into religious doctrine." 86
1. It may require reverter clauses in the deeds to the property of the
local churches.
2. It may provide in its constitution or by some other authoritative source
for the reverting of the local church property to the hierarchical body
upon withdrawal by the local congregation with an implied consent by
the local church to this provision.
3. It may obtain from the [State] General Assembly an act providing
for such a result.
249 Md. at 633, 241 A.2d at 699.
83 254 Md. at 166, 254 A.2d at 165.
84The Maryland court noted that to prevent the local congregations from
separating from the Eldership "would deny to the members of the local congregation their freedom of religion and would in effect put the judicial power of
the State behind the enforcement of the doctrine and discipline of the Eldership
thus, in effect, 'establishing' the religion promulgated by the Eldership." 254 Md.
at 175, 154 A.2d at 170 (emphasis in original).
85396 U.S. at 367. The Supreme Court has held that a dismissal for lack
of a federal question is a judgment on the merits of the case. Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
86396 U.S. at 368. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan restated the
command expressed in Presbyterian Church, that civil courts must "decide church
property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
Apparently trying to reconcile his twin endorsements in Presbyterian Church of
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D. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich:
The Demise of Neutral Principles?
The constitutional validity of the neutral-principles approach
was soon rendered uncertain by the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivoevich,87 which
appeared to extend significantly the limits of the deference doctrine
of Watson v. Jones, at the expense of the neutral-principles
88
approach.
At stake in Serbian was control of the property and assets of
the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States, a constituent part of the hierarchical Serbian Eastern Orthodox church,
(the mother church) that was headquartered in Yugoslavia. In
May 1963, the highest authority of the mother church, the Holy
Assembly of Bishops, suspended Bishop Milivojevich and reorganized into three dioceses the American-Canadian Diocese that
Milivojevich had headed. When Milivojevich refused to recognize
either his suspension or the diocesan reorganization, he was defrocked by the Holy Assembly. Milivojevich responded by convening the American-Canadian Diocesan National Assembly, which
attempted to circumvent the reorganization scheme by revising the
constitution and by declaring itself autonomous. 89 The Illinois
Supreme Court, considering the validity of the reorganization, concluded that the defrockment had been arbitrary and therefore in
valid, and that the mother church lacked the authority to reorganize
the diocese. 90 The United States Supreme Court reversed, and
sharply criticized the rejection by the Illinois court of the decision
both the modified Watson deference rule and the neutral-principles approach,
however, he also approved the converse proposition that states may alternatively
"adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long
as it involves no consideration of doctrinal issues." Id. 368. Mr. Justice Brennan
then suggested that both the modified Watson deference rule and a neutralprinciples approach were acceptable alternative methods of adjudication. Id.
368-70.
8T426 U.S. 696 (1976).
8
$McKeag, The Problem of Resolving Property Disputes in Hierarchical
Churches, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 281 (1977); Wis. Note, supra note 9, at 920-26; Note,
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, The Continuing Crusade for
Separation of Church and State, 18 WM. & MAuy L. Rxv. 665 (1977); 45
FonHrAs L. REv. 992 (1977).
89 Representatives of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church subsequently
brought suit against Bishop Milivojevich and the Illinois corporation that held the
church property, and requested the trial court to find that Milivojevich had been
properly removed as bishop and that the diocesan reorganization ordered by the
Holy Assembly was valid. Bishop Milivojevich counterclaimed, seeking a determination that his defrockment had been arbitrary and an injunction enjoining the
plaintiffs from interfering with the assets of the religious corporations.
9060 MI1.2d 447, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975).
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of the mother church's highest ecclesiastical tribunal. 91
preme Court instructed that:

The Su-

where resolution of [church] disputes cannot be made
without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law
and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of
the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of
hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as
binding on them, in their application to the religious
92
issues of doctrine or polity before them.
To many, this language introduced a "standard of strict nonintervention" into the area of hierarchical-church disputes.9 3
Commentators read the Court's decision as undercutting the contractual rationale of Watson v. Jones 9 and as presaging the demise
of the neutral-principles approach. 95 Close examination of the
Court's opinion reveals, however, that the actual decision is much
narrower than the passage quoted above implies. The Court's
analysis actually affirms Watson's consensual basis and does not in
any way threaten the vitality of neutral principles.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois court had
transgressed the boundary of permissible review on two counts. As
both parties had agreed that the "sole power to appoint and remove
Bishops of the Church reside[d] in its highest ranking organs," 11
the state court, in finding for Milivojevich, relied on the "arbitrariness" exception of Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila9 7 In so doing, it had engaged in an extensive interpretation
9

1Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976).

92 Id. 709.
93

See note 88 supra & accompanying text.

94 "The effect of Milivoievich is to severely circumscribe court activity in intra-

church disputes and to render the theoretical basis of this area of law, formerly
one of contract, uncertain." Wis. Note, supra note 9, at 924. "The decision thus
undercuts the contractual rationale of Watson that provided the basis for the rule
of deference to hierarchical tribunals." Id. 927.
95 [Serbian] would seem to signal the demise of the neutral principles of
law approach in adjudicating disputes within hierarchical churches.

Thus a rule emerges as to hierarchical churches that is clear and
definitive-the decision of a hierarchical church tribunal is final. Neutral
principles of law may not be used in the future to review those decisions ....
45 FORDHAm L. REv. 992, 1000-01 (1977).
96 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715.
97280

U.S. 1 (1929).

See notes 59-61 supra & accompanying text.
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of church laws and procedures. The Supreme Court found constitutionally impermissible this interpretation of "quintessentially religious" controversies "under the guise of 'minimal' review under
the umbrella of 'arbitrariness.'" 9s Instead of simply rejecting
this approach, however, the Court expressly abolished the arbitrariness exception 9
In addition, the Illinois court held the diocesan reorganization to be invalid on the ground that it "was 'in clear and palpable
excess of [the Holy Assembly's] jurisdiction.' "100 To reach this
conclusion, the court undertook an examination of the constitutions
of both the mother church and of the American diocese. It characterized its interpretation of the scope of the mother church's
jurisdiction as an application of "neutral principles," which would
not "entangle this court in the determination of theological or
doctrinal matters." 101 The Supreme Court also rejected this approach. Noting that the American-Canadian Diocese in fact had
subordinated itself to the mother church in matters administrative
as well as ecclesiastical, 02 it held that the ruling of the Illinois
court abridged the first amendment. The state court had "substituted its interpretation of the Diocesan or Mother church constitution for that of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals in which
church law vests authority to make that interpretation." 103
Thus, Serbian actually reaffirmed the consensual rationale of
Watson v. Jones and, by implication, elevated it to constitutional
status. 1 4 If the parties to an intrachurch dispute have agreed to
be bound by an ecclesiastical tribunal's decision in particular cases,
a civil court may not determine whether that tribunal has adhered
98 426 U.S. at 720.
99 [W]hether or not there is room for "marginal civil court review"
under the narrow rubrics of "fraud" or "collusion" when church tribunals
act in bad faith for secular purposes, no "arbitrariness" exception-in the
sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with the church laws and
regulations-is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts
are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.
Id. 713 (footnote omitted).
100 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill.
2d at 507, 328 N.E.2d
at 507, 328 N.E.2d at 284 (quoting Schweiker v. Husser, 146 InI. 399, 425, 34
N.E. 1022, 1030 (1893)).
10160 Ill.
2d at 505, 328 N.E.2d at 282. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721.
102426 U.S. at 722.
103

Id. 721.

104 Id. 713-14.
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to its own decisionmaking rules. Although Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Stevens, disputed the majority's
conclusion that the American-Canadian Diocese and Bishop Milivojevich had agreed to abide by the mother church's decisions in
matters at issue, he too accepted the "general principle that persons
who have contractually bound themselves to adhere to the decisions
of the ruling hierarchy in a private association may not obtain
relief from those decisions in a civil court." 105
The criticism that Serbian, "[b]y countenancing violations of
internal church law . . . thus disposes of the contractual theory
of membership in hierarchical religious associations," 108 therefore appears to be unfounded. The Serbian Court did not hold
that church laws embodying the terms of the contract "may not be
examined"; 107 rather, it determined upon examination that those
laws manifested a voluntary agreement between the parties to
abide by the decisions of the Holy Assembly. Indeed, it was the
Court's strict enforcement of this agreement that led it to reject
the inference drawn in Brundage v. Deardorf'0 8 and Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,10 9 that consent to be governed does not extend to actions by church tribunals in disregard
of the accepted laws of the church. In the face of such a compact,
civil courts may intervene to preserve the autonomy of a local
church, aggrieved by decisions of a hierarchical tribunal by which
it has agreed to be bound, only if the tribunal has acted fraudu0
lently or collusively."
III. Jones v. Wolf:

NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES RECONSIDERED

2
The combined effects of Presbyterian Church,"' Sharpsburg,"
114
but also conand Serbian113 not only confused commentators,
tributed to a series of conflicting decisions in state and lower federal
courts. The resulting uncertitude was attributable, in the main, to
105 Id. 732 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

10 6 Wis. Note, supra note 9, at 922.
107 Id.
See
10855 F. 839 (N.D. Ohio 1893), rev'd, 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899).
notes 55-58 supra & accompanying text.
109 280 U.S. 1 (1929). See notes 59-61 supra & accompanying text.
110 426 U.S. at 713.
"'IPresbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
112 Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396
U.S. 367 (1970).
113 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
114 See note 88 supra.
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judicial divergence, following Serbian, regarding the validity of
applying neutral principles in the face of a determination by a
hierarchical-church tribunal on the issue in dispute. Some courts
read Serbian as adopting a constitutional rule of compulsory deference in all cases to such determinations.;"" Other courts rejected
this approach in favor of a more narrow construction, one mandating deference to hierarchical bodies only when the dispute was not
susceptible to resolution under a neutral-principles approach.' 6
To a significant extent, this divergence reflected uncertainty regarding the appropriate limits of judicial inquiry into the nature
of religious associations. Apparently recognizing the need for a
more definitive statement, the Supreme Court took the occasion in
Jones v. Wolf 1 7 to elaborate on the nature and significance of
"neutral principles of law." Unfortunately, the Court's opinion
appears to raise as many questions as it answers concerning the
limits of authorized judicial review in church-property disputes.
A. The Early History of the Case
Jones v. Wolf arose out of a conflict between the Vineville
Presbyterian Church of Macon, Georgia (VPC) and the Presbyterian
Church in the United States (PCUS), one of several large Presbyterian denominations in this country." 8 Unable to resolve their
doctrinal differences, the congregation of VPC adopted, by a vote
of 165 to 94, a resolution which purported to separate the church
and its property from continued affiliation with PCUS. The majority faction of the congregation immediately notified the AugustaMacon Presbytery of PCUS of this action, and subsequently joined
with another Presbyterian denomination that was unaffiliated with
PCUS. Following adoption of the resolution, the majority faction
retained possession and control of VPC's property and assets. The
115 See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church, 430
F. Supp. 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (civil courts must defer to hierarchical-church
decisions); Presbytery of the Covenant v. First Presbyterian Church, 552 S.W.2d
865 (Tex Civ. App. 1977) (same).
116 See, e.g., Kelley v. Riverside Blvd. Independent Church of God, 44 Il.
App. 3d 673, 358 N.E.2d 696 (1976)

(first amendment does not require deference

to church-court decisions); Board of Church Extension v. Eads, 230 S.E.2d 911,
919 n.6 (W. Va. 1976) (deference to hierarchical-church-court decision required
only when "a case is not susceptible to the application of completely neutral

principles of law").
117443 U.S. 595 (1979).
118 Jones v. Wolf, No. 45787 D-2 (Bibb Super. Ct., filed Sept. 30, 1977). The
parties entered into a written stipulation of facts, which was incorporated into the
court's order and adopted in full as the court's findings of fact. Id.
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minority group ceased to participate in the affairs of VPC, and was
refused the privilege of using VPC premises as an adjunct of PCUS.
Although the separation resolution was adopted, in conformity
with PCUS's Book of Church Order, by a majority vote of the
congregation," 9 PCUS responded by appointing an administrative
commission which issued an ex parte "ruling, order and judgment"
that declared the minority faction the true congregation of VPC
and withdrew from the majority faction all authority derived from
PCUS. 20 The commission's order purported further to retract all
of the majority faction's ecclesiastical privileges and rights to VPC
property.
Shortly thereafter, members of the minority faction brought
an equitable action in the Georgia state court for a declaratory
adjudication of their rights to exclusive use of VPC premises and
for a permanent injunction preventing the majority group from
continuing to use the property in any manner other than as a
unit of PCUS. The petition asserted that the minority group was
the true congregation as decreed by the PCUS commission and
that the majority was "acting unlawfully in continuing to maintain
possession and control of the church property to the exclusion" of
the minority.' 2 ' The majority responded that it "had a right to
withdraw from PCUS upon appropriate resolution of the congregation; that the PCUS commission had no authority over VPC
property nor authority to name any of the petitioners as trustees
of VPC," and that the majority held lawful possession and control
22
of VPC premises..
To the Georgia courts, Jones v. Wolf presented a typical
church-property dispute between a local church, represented by
the majority of its congregation, and a hierarchical religious society with which the local church was previously associated, represented by a minority faction of that local congregation. The
trial court found that, at the time the separation resolution was
adopted, the classes represented by the respective litigants together
"i9Brief for Respondent at 4, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
"The
PGUS Book of Church Order, 14th Printing (1972), was in effect at the time this
controversy arose. Section 5-6 of the Book of Church Order provide[d] for the
adoption of resolutions at congregational meetings by a majority vote." Id. 4
n.4. At that time, however, "the Book of Church Order contained no prohibition
against the withdrawal of a congregation without the approval of PCUS, although
such a provision was [subsequently] added, to the fifteenth printing at section 4-2."
Id. 4 n.5.
320

Id. 4.

121 Id. 5.
122!d.5-6

(footnote omitted).
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constituted the congregation of VPC, which in turn was a memberunit of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of PCUS. Accordingly,
the court described the legal issue presented as "the right to control church properties as between the central church organization
(or a faction claiming under it) and the local church congregation
when the latter becomes dissatisfied with the affiliation and seeks
for whatever reason to withdraw." 12
Initially, the trial court recognized the constitutional requirement, enunciated in Presbyterian Church'12 and reaffirmed in
Serbian,2 5 that civil courts decide church-property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. In
professed compliance with this mandate, the court proceeded to
adjudicate the dispute by employing the neutral-principles approach
approved by the Supreme Court in Sharpsburg16 and subsequently
adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church v.
Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church 127 and Carnes v. Smith.12s
These cases sanctioned civil-court examination of property deeds,
state statutes regarding religious corporations, church corporate
charters, and provisions in church constitutions-provided that such
examination did not intrude into doctrinal matters. Applying
these rules to the controversy at hand, the trial court found nothing
in the pertinent documents to indicate any express or implied trust
of VPC property in favor of any group other than VPC's local congregation. 12D The court concluded as a matter of law that VPC
was properly represented by the majority faction of the local church.
In so doing, it expressly denied that PCUS possessed the authority
to declare the minority group the true congregation, "for the purpose of creating a trust relationship with respect to the church
property of VPC when none previously existed, expressly or by
implication." 130
45787 D-2 (Bibb Super. Ct., filed Sept. 30, 1977).
notes 71-76 supra & accompanying text.
notes 87-110 supra & accompanying text.
notes 79-86 supra & accompanying text.
127225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
Garnes
128 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
involved a property dispute between the United Methodist Church and a local
congregation that had withdrawn from that organization. The local congregation
refused to allow the use of its property as part of the general United Methodist
Church. The Georgia Supreme Court, applying "neutral principles," determined
that the parties had contemplated that the local church would hold the church
property in favor of the United Methodist Church, and accordingly affirmed the
grant of an injunction awarding control of the property to that body. See Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. at 600-01.
29
1 No. 45787 D-2 (Bibb Super. Ct., filed Sept. 30, 1977).
123 No.
24
1 See
2 5
' See
2
1 6 See

13o Id.
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On appeal, the minority faction again argued that it was entitled to the property because it had remained loyal to PCUS. The
Georgia Supreme Court rejected this contention and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court on the ground that "more than a mere
connectional relationship between the local and general churches
must exist to give rise to property rights in the general church." 131
Representatives of the minority faction thereafter petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Pointing to the conflict
and confusion among the states concerning the application of the
first amendment principles enunciated in Presbyterian Church and
Serbian, the petitioners urged the Court to provide a more defini132
tive statement of the constitutional rules in this area.
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1.Endorsement of Neutral Principles
The "question for decision" posed in Jones v. Wolf was defined
by the Supreme Court as "whether civil courts, consistent with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve
[a church-property] dispute on the basis of 'neutral principles of
law,' or whether they must defer to the resolution of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church." 1.3 Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, prefaced his opinion by indicating
the fundamental constitutional limitation that circumscribes the
role civil courts may play in this area. "Most importantly," he
declared, "the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrines and
Mr.
practice." 134 As a "corollary to this commandment," 13
Justice Blackmun asserted that, in regard to such religious matters, civil courts are constitutionally required to defer to the resolution reached within the religious association. Subject to these
constraints, however, states are free to "adopt any one of various
approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual
131Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860, 863 (1978),

vacated, 443

U.S. 595 (1979).
132Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-18, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595
(1979). The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari on October 10, 1978.
439 U.S. 891 (1978). In a decision on July 2, 1979, it vacated the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Georgia and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
133 443 U.S. at 597.
134 Id. 602.
'35
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and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." 136 Finding neutral
principles, "[a]t least in general outline," 137 consistent with these
constitutional limitations, the Court accordingly held that states
are "constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law
as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute." 138 Before
considering whether the Georgia court properly applied such principles to the facts of the case, however, the Court, in an enthusiastic
endorsement of that approach, elaborated for the first time upon
the propriety of its general application.
At least as approved in Sharpsburg, the neutral-principles
analysis involved a judicial examination of numerous sourcesincluding property deeds, relevant state statutes, and pertinent provisions in church documents-to determine the body in which the
competing religious groups themselves originally intended to place
ultimate authority over church property. Although this inquiry
entailed a review of certain church documents, it was explicitly
designed to avoid drawing civil courts into religious controversies.
Rather, courts were to ascertain and effectuate the private arrangements of affiliated churches, as evinced by the terms of their
association.
The endorsement in Jones v. Wolf of the neutral-principles
method for settling church-property disputes reflects the Court's
continued adherence to this contractual rationale. Indeed, the
"peculiar genius" of this analysis, in the Court's view, consists essentially in its "flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations
to reflect the intentions of the parties." 139 Because neutral principles do not purport to do anything other than resolve churchproperty disputes in accordance with the express or implicit desires
of the litigants, "all forms of church organization and polity" 140
can be accommodated by this approach. Significantly, the four dissenting Justices also appeared to have accepted this same underlying
rationale. While vigorously contesting both the Court's construction of neutral principles and the application of those principles
to this particular case, the dissent maintained nevertheless that
"[t]he proper rule of decision requires a court to give effect in all
136Id. (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).
137 Id.

138 Id. 604.
139 Id. 603.

140 Id.
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cases to the decisions of the church government agreed upon by
the members before the dispute arose." 141
In certain respects, however, the Court's exposition of "neutral
principles of law" seems to vary significantly, at least in emphasis,
from prior statements of the doctrine. To begin with, the Court
in Jones v. Wolf defined the appropriate objective of judicial inquiry into church documents and other relevant sources far more
precisely than did earlier opinions. Under the Court's interpretation, civil courts adopting the neutral-principles approach must
examine relevant evidentiary sources for the select purpose of determining "whether there [is] any basis for a trust [of local church
property] in favor of the general church." 142 The Court contrasted
this limited inquiry with the dissent's broad contention that a civil
court should examine relevant sources to ascertain the body in
which competing church groups had placed ultimate authority
over the church property. 143 While the Court recognized that this
task, in many cases, would not prove to be difficult, it nevertheless
insisted that, in others, "the locus of control would be ambiguous,"
and that in such cases the dissent's approach "would appear to
require 'asearching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church
polity.'

"

144

Ostensibly, the explanation for the Court's more restrictive
formulation of neutral principles is to be found in its professed
desire to isolate decisions regarding church property from other
determinations involving matters at the core of ecclesiastical concern. As viewed by the Court, the main attraction of neutral-principles analysis resides in its promise to free civil courts from entanglement in matters of religious doctrine, practice, and internal
administration. Consistent with the admonition in Serbian that
"a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church
tribunals as it finds them," 145 Mr. Justice Blackmun's construction represented an attempt to remove from civil adjudication all
"quintessentially religious" 146 questions. To this end, he instructed
civil courts undertaking an examination of church documents to
"take special care to scrutinize the document[s] in purely secular
terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether
141

dissenting).
Id. 614 (Powell, J.,

-142 Id. 600.

143 Id. 604-05.
144 Id. (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723
(1976)).
145 Serbian,426 U.S. at 713.
146 Id. 720.
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the document[s] indicate[] that the parties have intended to create
a trust." 147 Courts adopting this method for resolving churchproperty disputes must examine the parties' outward expressions
of intent to determine whether they meant to place the right to
control the property in someone other than the formal titleholder.
The judicial inquiry must eschew reliance on religious precepts,
however, and instead base its analysis solely "on objective, wellestablished concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers
and judges." 148
2. The Decision to Remand: The Problem of Characterizing the
Dispute
In view of its strong endorsement of the neutral-principles approach, the Supreme Court's actual disposition in Jones v. Wolf
was somewhat surprising, inasmuch as it accepted without question
the holding by the trial court that the VPC property was owned by
the local church free of any trust interest in PCUS. 149 The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Georgia court, ostensibly because the grounds for the latter's decision had not been adequately
articulated.150 Specifically, the Supreme Court took issue with the
Georgia court's reliance on Carnes v. Smith 151 and Presbyterian
Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church' 52 without distinguishing "a significant complicating factor" 158-the presence of
two factions, each claiming to represent the VPC. In contrast to
the trial court's characterization, the Supreme Court saw the issue
as which of the two competing factions of the formerly united Vineville congregation was actually entitled to the church property.
The Georgia court, in deciding that the property vested in the
local church as against the general church, had applied neutral principles, but then summarily decided that the majority faction indeed
acted for the local church. In the Supreme Court's view, the basis
for the state court's determination that the majority, not the minority, represented the local church had not been spelled out. The
directions on remand, therefore, were essentially to set forth ex147 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604.
148 Id. 603.

Id. 600.
150 Id. 610.
'49

L51 See note 128 supra &accompanying text.
15 2 See note 127 supra &accompanying text.
153

443 U.S. at 606.
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plicit guidelines, consonant with the first amendment, for adjudicating this issue.154
By characterizating the crucial issue in the case as the identification of the "true" VPC congregation, the loyal, minority faction
sought to persuade the Supreme Court that the case involved not a
property dispute but a question "at the core of ecclesiastical concern." 155 The basic premise of its argument was that VPC, as a
member of the PCUS hierarchical organization, was subject to all
decisions rendered by appropriate PCUS tribunals. Here, the tribunal designated by PCUS had identified and decreed the minority
faction to be VPC's "true congregation" as a matter of PGUS's
internal church government. As a result, the minority maintained,
its authority over the church premises necessarily must be accepted
as an incident of this ecclesiastical determination. The minority
distinguished the endorsement of neutral principles in Presbyterian
Church and Sharpsburg as "simply not analogous to this case," 156
on the ground that those decisions concerned property disputes
between a general and a local congregation.
The minority claimed moreover that the Georgia court effectively violated its members' rights under the free exercise clause by
redetermining the identity of VPC's "true congregation" and, on
the basis of that determination, by awarding control of VPG's
property to the majority's representatives. A civil court, the minority argued, may not indirectly overrule a church tribunal's decision concerning an ecclesiastical question by substituting its own
judgment under the guise of "neutral principles." Instead, a civil
court may resort to the application of neutral principles of law
only in the absence of a controlling church-tribunal's determination. Any other reconciliation of the Watson deference principle
with the neutral-principles approach, the minority maintained,
"would allow both judicial nullification of the parties' agreement
to be bound by the church court decision, and wholesale denigration of the private association law which gave rise to that agreement." -15 By characterizing the question at issue as the determination of the "true" Vineville church congregation, the minority was
forced to rely on Watson's presumption of implied consent. Indeed, the minority faction conceded that its argument depended
154 Id. 610.
155 Brief for the Petitioners at 15 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717 (1976)).
156 Brief for the Petitioners at 33.
157 Id. 30.
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ultimately on the presumption that all member churches of a
hierarchical religious society have, "as a matter of simple contract
and private association law, bound themselves to adhere to the
decisions of those churches' ruling hierarchies." 158
Counsel for the majority faction responded that the Georgia
courts did no more than apply the ordinary presumption that,
absent some indication to the contrary, a voluntary organization is
represented by a majority of its members. They vigorously rejected
the minority's attempt to classify the real dispute as ecclesiastical
in nature. Although the majority conceded the authority of PCUS
to recognize any group it designated as its "true congregation," it
firmly denied the general church's power to "adjudicate the property rights [of the local church] in the guise of making 'ecclesiastical'
decisions." 159
The decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf left the
Georgia Supreme Court free on remand to adopt explicitly either
of the approaches advocated by the respective litigants. On the one
hand, Georgia law might provide that the identity of a local church
affiliated with a hierarchical religious organization must be determined according to the "laws and regulations" of the hierarchy.
If it should choose to do so, the Court hypothesized, "then the
First Amendment requires that the Georgia courts give deference
to the [hierarchical] commission's determination of that church's
identity." 1(0 On the other hand, the Supreme Court recognized
the possibility that Georgia might instead adopt "a presumptive
rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the
identity of the local church is to be determined by some other
means." 101
The Supreme Court cautioned against the application of an
irrebuttable presumption of majority rule, however. It observed
that under the neutral-principles approach "any rule of majority
representation can always be overcome." 162 Accordingly, the
158 Id. 29.

159 Brief for Respondents at 15.
160 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 609 (footnote omitted). The Court noted, in
this regard, that the Georgia Code mandates the vesting of property conveyed to a
church in accordance with any limitations set forth in the deed, for use "according
to the mode of church government or rules of discipline." Id. See Ga. Code Ann.
§§ 22-5507, 22-5508 (1977). It failed to point out the Georgia Supreme Court's
express instruction that these provisions "do not purport to give a general church
any rights in local church property other than those rights set forth in the documents of church government." 241 Ga. at 211, 243 S.E.2d at 863.
:L1 443 U.S. at 607.
162 Id.
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Court instructed that, in the event the Georgia Supreme Court
did adopt such a rule, it should "specify how, under Georgia law,
that presumption may be overcome." 163 "Because these critical
issues of state law remain[ed] undetermined," the Court professed
to "express no view as to the ultimate outcome of the controversy
if the Georgia Supreme Court adopt[ed] a presumptive rule of
majority representation." 164 Nevertheless, the Court did not hesitate to suggest that provisions in the corporate charter or the constitution of the general church, which indicated either "that the
identity of the local church is to be established in some other way,
or . . . that the church property is held in trust for the general
church and those who remain loyal to it," 165 would overcome the
presumptive rule."66 Unlike the deference approach, this kind of
rule "would be consistent with both the neutral-principles analysis
and the First Amendment." 167
C. The Nature of the Inquiry Under Neutral Principles:
An Attempt at Clarification and Reconciliation
1. The Court's Position
A major source of confusion in the opinion of the Court in
Jones v. Wolf is the suggestion that judicial inquiry into church
163 Id. 608 n.5.
164 Id. In determining that neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court of

Georgia had articulated a presumptive rule of majority representation, the Supreme
Court was technically correct. Yet, as the Court itself recognized, the Georgia
Code does expressly provide that "[t]he majority of those who adhere to its
organization and doctrines represent the church." Id. 608 n.6; see Ga. Code Ann.
§ 22-5504 (1977). The Court nevertheless refused to infer that the Georgia
courts followed this provision, however, because the Georgia Supreme Court did
not even mention it and because the majority faction did not claim at trial any
right of possession of the Vineville Church property under this section. 443 U.S.
at 608 n.6. But the simple explanation for these failures, as the Georgia
Supreme Court pointed out on remand, lies in the fact that the provision in
question applies "only to churches having a congregational form of government."
244 Ga. 388, 389, 260 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1979). And at the trial stage, at least, both
the court and the litigants apparently perceived the crux of the dispute to be
between PGUS and VPC, not between the majority and minority factions of VPC.
Thus, it should have come as no surprise when on remand the Georgia Supreme
Court expressly adopted the presumptive rule of majority representation and
unanimously reinstated its affrmance of the judgment of the trial court. Id.
1135 443 U.S. at 608.
166 In conformance with the Supreme Court's instructions, the Georgia court
adopted a rule of majority representation and specified that it could be overcome
under neutral principles by indication of a contrary intention in neutral statutes,
corporate charters, relevant deeds, and organizational constitutions. But the court's
review of those sources in this particular case disclosed no evidence rebutting the
presumption of majority representation, at least with respect to the use and control
of the church premises. See note 164 supra.
167 443 U.S. at 607.
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polity is now constitutionally prohibited. At least on the surface,
the Court appears to assume that the first amendment forbids
consideration by civil courts of church constitutions, charters, and
other relevant documents for evidence pertaining to the form of
government voluntarily adopted by the churches upon their affiliation. Indeed, one of the advantages claimed for the neutral-principles approach is that it "obviates entirely the need for an analysis
or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church
property disputes." 168 For all that, it is nonetheless difficult to
reconcile this position with the contrary prescription, implicit in

the Court's opinion, that civil courts should examine church documents establishing a church's polity in order to ascertain "what
religious body" the parties intended to have "determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy." 169 On close
examination, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between the
process of determining whether the parties meant to create a
trust in favor of the general church and that of deciding in whom
the parties intended to place ultimate authority over the church
property.
The apparent discrepancy may be traced to a subtle yet crucial
misapprehension of the constitutional parameters fixed in Presbyterian Church,1 70 Sharpsburg,1l7 and Serbian.172 All three decisions recognized the danger that adjudication of church-property
disputes might entangle civil courts in "quintessentially religious
controversies." 173 For this reason, the Court held in Presbyterian
Church that the first amendment "commands civil courts to decide
church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies
over religious doctrine." 174 Similarly, Sharpsburg's approval of
judicial inquiry into and reliance on provisions in religious documents was expressly conditioned on the fact that the state "court's
resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into religious doc268 Id. 605.
369

Id. 603.

170 See notes 71-76 supra &accompanying text.
71

1

72

1

See notes 79-86 supra& accompanying text.
See notes 87-110 supra &accompanying text.

173 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976).
"First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation
is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious
doctrine or practice." Id. 709-10 (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
'17 Id.
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trine." 175 In Serbian, the Court reaffirmed the prohibition against
judicial intrusion into purely ecclesiastical matters and emphasized
that resolution of "quintessentially religious controversies" must
be left to the "church judicatory in which authority to make the
decision resides." 176
Despite the Court's intimation to the contrary in Jones v.
Wolf, however, Serbian neither foreclosed civil-court inquiry into
the form of polity adopted by associated churches nor compelled
judicial deference to the resolution of an altercation regarding
church polity by a tribunal of a hierarchical church. Far from
requiring civil courts to refrain from examining church documents
for evidence of the polity adopted by members of a religious association, the Court's decision in Serbian itself was based on an7
examination of provisions in the respective church documents' 7
As in Sharpsburg, the church charters and constitutions, the deeds
to the disputed property, and the relevant state statutes were canvassed specifically "for information about the basic polity" 178
adopted by the competing religious groups. On the basis of this
investigation, the Court concluded that ultimate authority to prescribe the use of the church property was, in Sharpsburg,with the
local congregation and, in Serbian, with the hierarchical church
organization. In neither case, however, did the judicial inquiry
into church polity involve an impermissible entanglement in religious matters. What the Court held impermissible was not the
ascertainment of polity by means of a careful examination of church
documents, but rather, as the dissent in Jones v. Wolf noted, "the
state court's further inquiry into the faithfulness of the church
hierarchy's decisions to the detailed provisions of church law." 179
Indeed, it was precisely because the polity previously adopted by
the quarreling factions committed the matters in dispute to the
exclusive province of the mother-church organization that the
Serbian Court refused to permit the state court to substitute its
interpretation of church law for that of the hierarchical tribunal
in which authority to make the interpretation was found.
175 Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396
U.S. 367, 368 (1970); see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 612 n.1 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
176 426 U.S. at 720.
177

See note 107 supra & accompanying text.

178 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 612 n.1 (Powell, J.,dissenting).

179Id. 620 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 712-13, 718, 721-23; id. 725 (White, J., concurring)).
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If Jones v. Wolf does stand for the proposition that judicial
intervention in church-property disputes may no longer entail an
investigation into church polity, then it certainly represents a
significant and possibly unjustifiable digression from prior decisions.
In our view, however, the Court's opinion is susceptible to a more
considered and sympathetic interpretation, one that construes the
neutral-principles approach somewhat less restrictively. Under
this interpretation, courts addressing property disputes may consider the polity adopted by church groups so long as they refrain
from resolving the conflict on the basis of religious doctrine or
practice. After all, judicial examination of church charters and
constitutions in order to determine whether there is any basis
for finding a trust of church property does constitute an investi.
gation into church polity. The characteristics of such an inquiry,
however, must be carefully defined. Civil courts are to look to
the form of government manifested in church documents only to
locate the body in which the religious associations intended to
place ultimate authority over church property. If that polity indicates "what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or what religious body [is to] determine the
ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy," 180
civil courts will be bound by the Court's admonition "to give effect
to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in
some legally cognizable form." 1l
Assuming this analysis to be correct, all nine members of the
Court basically agree on the proper aim of judicial inquiry into
church-property disputes under "neutral principles of law." Courts
should examine all legally cognizable evidence for the purpose of
determining in whom, at the time of their association, the competing groups intended to place ultimate authority over the church
property in dispute. The main difference, then, between the conflicting positions set forth by the majority and the dissent in Jones
v. Wolf centers not on the ultimate goal of judicial inquiry, but
rather on the scope of "legally cognizable evidence" of church
intent regarding control of its property. It is necessary, therefore,
to explore the dissent's view of constitutionally permissible adjudication in an attempt to reconcile it with the Court's conception of neutral principles of law.

18o Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603.
181 Id. 606.
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2. The Dissent's View, and a Response
Labeling it "newly defined" 182 and a "depart[ure] from longestablished precedents," 18 the dissent, speaking through Mr. Justice Powell, took strong exception to the Court's conception of
"neutral principles of law." The focus of the dissent's criticism
was the Court's directive that civil tribunals adopting this approach
must scrutinize church documents in secular terms for evidence
of a trust, without reliance on religious precepts or doctrine. Inasmuch as church charters and constitutions "tend to be drawn in
terms of religious precepts," 184 the dissent countered, "[a]ttempting
to read them 'in purely secular terms' is more likely to promote
confusion than understanding." 1s1 The dissent also contended
that the Court's approach would effectively preclude certain types
of evidence from judicial consideration altogether. In its view,
confining civil courts exclusively to reliance on evidence cognizable
in secular terms would deny to them relevant evidence pertaining
to the church's form of government whenever that polity "has not
been expressed in specific statements referring to the property of a
church." 186

The dissent may have been somewhat misled by Mr. Justice
Blackmun's insistence that, in applying neutral principles of law,
courts should rely not on religious precepts but on "objective,
well-established concepts of trust and property law." 187 In order
to ascertain whether a local congregation intended to relinquish
control over its property upon association with a hierarchical
church, he stated, courts are to examine numerous sources, including religious documents, "for language of trust in favor of the
general church, . . . [and should] take special care to scrutinize

the document in purely secular terms." 188 The dissent read these
instructions as prohibiting consideration of any evidence of the litigants' intentions with respect to church property unless the parties
have reached an express understanding regarding the property.
Close examination of the Court's opinion reveals little justification,
however, for reading such a limitation into the neutral-principles
approach. The dissent's criticisms overlook the sophistication with
Id. 610 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. 611 (Powell, J., dissenting).
184 Id. 612 (Powell, J., dissenting).
182
188

185 Id.
186

Id. 612-13 (Powell,

187 Id. 603.
188 Id. 604.

J., dissenting).
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which established principles of trust law can be employed to
ascertain the existence of an implied trust.
What apparently concerned the dissent was the possibility
that a particular congregation might submit itself to the authority
of a hierarchical-church organization, without expressly subordinating control over church property. But associated churches need
not explicitly refer to property to indicate the intention that the
general church is to have unfettered authority over the local church
in all matters, including control over property. So long as the
nature of the relationship may be judicially inferred without entanglement in religious doctrine, there is no reason for a court
not to enforce the terms of that relationship.
The Court's elaboration upon "neutral principles" in Jones
v. Wolf, in effect, represents no more than an attempt "to constrain
the grounds on which courts act, instructing them above all to
avoid modes of decision that involve resolving by law issues of
religious faith and doctrine." 189 Short of such an intrusion, however, courts are entitled to adjudicate church disputes over property "inaccord with the desires" 110 of the religious association as
framed prior to the dispute, at least to the extent that those desires
are evident. When a written document contains an express provision respecting control over the property, this task will not prove
difficult. In the absence of such an explicit guide, however, courts
adopting neutral principles still must attempt to discern the parties'
original intentions respecting the control of church property and
to enforce that understanding. Evidence that a local congregation
intended, upon affiliating with another religious organization, to
cede its autonomy to that group certainly would support a finding
that the parties also contemplated a trust of the local church's
property in favor of the general church, despite the absence of any
specific statement referring to the property.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Jones v. Wolf seriously
contended that judicial examination of religious documents is
constitutionally prohibited. As contrasted with the secular inquiry advocated by the majority, however, the dissent appeared to
suggest that courts should rely on religious precepts in the course
of interpreting and evaluating such documents. 191 Yet to the extent that courts do so, they might abridge the distinct constitutional rule-clearly enunciated in Presbyterian Church and re189 L. TBmE, supra note 9, § 14-13, at 882.
190 Jones v. Wolf,443 U.S. at 604.
191 Id.611-12 (Powell, J., clissenting).
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peatedly affirmed in Sharpsburg, Serbian, and now Jones v. Wolf
-that civil adjudication of church-property disputes must avoid
modes of decision that require inquiry into ecclesiastical matters
of faith and doctrine. Thus, the dissent's claim that attempting to
read church documents in secular rather than religious terms is
"more likely to promote confusion than understanding," 192 is questionable. Although civil courts have an expertise in the tasks of
interpreting documents and discovering the intentions of parties
to contracts, that expertise presumably does not extend to ecclesiastical matters. 93 By refusing to undertake an inquiry into such
questions, the Court in effect is heeding Professor Chafee's advice
against rushing into the "dismal swamp" of obscure church rules
and doctrines. 94 As to these matters, the Court appears to be saying, only members of the religious association can claim to speak
with competence.
Nevertheless, the dissent's criticisms do highlight the important insight that judicial inquiry into either a church's polity
or its intentions respecting church property, by its very nature,
cannot possibly be "purely secular." As Professor Kauper recognized, "civil courts in identifying a church's polity for legal
purposes are necessarily at the same time passing on important
ecclesiastical questions respecting the nature of the church and
its authority." 95 No less is involved when a court attempts to
determine whether the members of a religious society intended to
create a trust. For whether a court investigates religious documents to ascertain in which body the polity of the religious society
has placed ultimate authority over church property or to discover
whether there is any basis for finding a trust of that property in
favor of a body other than the formal titleholder, "it is resolving
a legal issue by reference to a standard that requires a judicial
interpretation of ecclesiastical sources." 196
The critical distinction that must be drawn, however, lies
between a strictly secular inquiry into these sources, designed
solely to accord legal effect to the private arrangements of a re192 Id. 612 (Powell, J., dissenting).
193 See Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions in Private
Associations, 76 HAmv. L. REv. 983, 991-92 (1963), and cases cited therein raising
questions such as the proper interpretation of the doctrine of "plenary inspiration"
and whether "goats are sheep in disobedience." Judicial review of the decisions
of a church tribunal on these issues likely would constitute "an appeal from a
learned body to an unlearned body." Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations
Not for Profit, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 993, 1024 (1930).
194 Chafee, supranote 193, at 1024.
195 Kauper, supra note 9, at 371.
196 Id.
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ligious association respecting property, and a more extensive reading of these sources in religious terms that would require a judicial
evaluation of matters of ecclesiastical faith and doctrine. Recognition of this distinction, and its role in delimiting neutral-principles
analysis, is the first step toward harmonizing the Court's endorsement of neutral principles and the dissent's concern that this
approach will "interfere with the free exercise of religion in accordance with church polity and doctrine." 197
3. Application of Neutral Principles in Jones v. Wolf
The four dissenting Justices did not see any reason to apply
neutral principles in Jones v. Wolf. Perceiving no occasion for
further examination of the law of Georgia, they instead would have
reversed and directed the Georgia court to enter judgment for
the minority faction.
The dissent recognized that the schism in the Vineville Church
stemmed from disagreements regarding doctrine and practice.
Under the laws and regulations of PCUS, the hierarchy retained
general and unqualified authority to resolve these questions for the
membership of PCUS. Similarly, power to review the discipline of
church members also resided in appropriate tribunals of the hierarchy. These tribunals had resolved the issues in controversy by
purporting to grant legal ownership of VPC property to the minority faction of the congregation that had remained loyal to PCUS.
By awarding control of the property to the dissident majority, in
the face of a decision to the contrary by an authoritative PCUS
tribunal, the Georgia court, according to the dissent, had reversed
the doctrinal decision of the church tribunal. For this reason, the
dissent refused to accept the trial court's determination that the
local congregation at no time surrendered control over its property to the general church. In its view, the Court's endorsement
of a secular inquiry into the intentions of the parties simply could
not "be justified on the ground that it 'free[s] civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity,
and practice.' "198 For, according to the dissent, "indirect interference" by civil courts in the "resolution of religious disputes
within the church," no less than direct decisions regarding questions of doctrine and practice, is "proscribed by the First Amendment." 199
197 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 616 (Powell, J., dissenting).
198 Id. 613 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting id. 603).
,
199 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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This apparent equation of questions of doctrine and practice
with questions of control over church property, in our view, constitutes a flaw in the dissent's analysis. Inasmuch as the first
amendment prohibits judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical matters of
doctrine and practice, resolution of such issues necessarily must
be made, if at all, within the structure of church government.
Whether a civil court may inquire into church-property disputes,
however, depends entirely on whether the parties committed those
questions to the exclusive province of a particular religious society.
And this issue is not an exclusively ecclesiastical issue but rather
one that properly may be submitted to a civil court for resolution.
The dissent apparently assumed that the membership of VPC,
by committing final review of decisions respecting doctrine, practice, and church discipline to the hierarchy,20 0 in effect did consent
to the authority of PCUS over VPC in all matters, including property control. But the question whether VPC members actually
submitted themselves to PCUS's final authority in doctrinal matters is distinct from the question whether VPC meant to give to
PCUS the authority either to control the church property or to
identify VPC and its representatives for purposes of property ownership. Indeed, the power to constitute the titleholder would be
equivalent to the right of control over church property. And
whether the issue presented in Jones v. Wolf is described as a dispute over the ownership of VPC's property or over who represents
VPC for purposes of property ownership, no constitutional considerations bar civil courts from determining for themselves whether
the local church, upon its affiliation with a hierarchical organization, meant to confer on the latter body the authority claimed.
It was just such an inquiry, through an examination of the
relevant documents, that convinced both Georgia courts that
PCUS "had no authority by resolution to constitute [the minority
faction of VPC] as the true congregation for the purpose of creating
a trust relationship with respect to the church property of VPC
200

The local church was said to consist of "all the communing members of the
active roll" of the church, which in turn was composed "of those admitted to the

Lord's table who are active in the church's life and work." Boox ov CHUmCH
ORDER OF TmE 1SESByEaAN CHURCH §§ 6-2, 8-7; App. 35, 38 (1972).
Local
church representatives were given the power "to suspend or exclude from the
Lord's Supper those found delinquent, according to the rules of Discipline." Id.
§ 15-6(2); App. 51. Such decisions were subject to "the review and contror'
of the hierarchy as part of its general authority to "order whatever pertains to the
spiritual welfare of the churches under its care." Id. §§ 14-5, 16-7(19); App. 49,
56. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 609 n.7.
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when none previously existed." 2 01 The objection that the Georgia
courts thereby imposed their own form of government and procedure in determining who constitutes the church is simply a mischaracterization of the outcome. Those courts did not substitute
their own resolution of a religious question for that of an ecclesiastical tribunal; rather, they determined that the identity of VPC,
at least for the purpose of property ownership, was not a matter
of the internal affairs of PCUS because VPC neither intended nor
consented to confer on PCUS the authority to make that determination. And whether a particular question is a matter of internal
church affairs, which may not be intruded upon by a civil court,
depends entirely on whether the parties consented, either expressly
or by implication, to have the issue resolved within the structure
of church government.
A local church may, of course, affiliate with a hierarchically
structured religious society on terms that would effectively place
the property of the local church under the control and disposition
of the hierarchical body. If a local church has in fact agreed to
submit property disputes to specially established church tribunals
for resolution, civil courts must then accept such determinations as
conclusive, at least in the absence of fraud or collusion. But when
a local church challenges the hierarchical organization's authority
to dispose of its property, no Supreme Court decision mandates
that a civil court must defer automatically to an ecclesiastical tribunal's ruling on that question. Nor has any decision of the Court
conditioned the application of neutral principles upon the absence
of a ruling by an ecclesiastical tribunal. Despite a hierarchical
tribunal's determination, a civil court may still inquire into the
nature of the relationship between the local congregation and the
general church in order to determine whether the former in fact
consented to the latter's authority to make that particular determination.
The Court's endorsement of judicial inquiry into the intentions of the parties under the rubric of neutral principles thus represents a significant doctrinal development. It presumes that more
than a mere association between the parties is necessary to accord
one party rights over the other's property. A church may choose
to affiliate with a separate hierarchical religious organization for
certain purposes, consenting to the latter's "authority" to resolve
questions of doctrine and practice for that association, and at the
same time retain its autonomy and its right to prescribe the use
201

No. 45787 D-2 (Bibb Super. Ct., £ded Sept. 30, 1977).
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and control of its property.2 02 When a church affiliates on these
terms, the members remain free, in the event of a disagreement
over doctrine or practice, simply to sever the local church's relation with the hierarchical organization and withdraw itself and its
property from that association, regardless of any purported adjudication of this question by the hierarchy. Thus, even if VPC on
becoming a member unit of PCUS consented to that body's authority to resolve questions of faith and practice for the entire
membership of PCUS, that consent alone would not necessarily
constitute consent on the part of VPC either to create a trust of its
property in favor of the general church or to cede to PCUS the
autonomous control over its affairs, by becoming inseparably integrated into and completely subordinated to that organization.
IV. THE EFFECT OF Jones v. Wolf:

CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

Jones v. Wolf makes clear that states are constitutionally entitled to adopt "neutral principles of law" as a means of adjudicating church-property disputes. Under this approach, the aim of
judicial inquiry is to ascertain the body in which the parties
mutually consented to place ultimate authority over the property,
so as to decide the controversy in accord with the intentions of
the parties. Provided the churches in association have embodied
their intentions in some legally cognizable form, "civil courts will
be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties." 203
202 This argument is supported by the amicus curiae brief submitted by the
Presbyterian Church in America. This hierarchical organization specifically maintains the autonomy of local congregational control over church property. The
Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in America reads: "All particular churches
shall be entitled to hold, own and enjoy their own local properties, without any
right of reversion whatsoever to any Presbytery, General Assembly, or any other
courts hereafter created, trustees or other officers of such courts." PRESBYTERIA1T
CHrRcH IN AmERIcA, BooK OF CuRcm ORDER § 26-9, quoted in Brief Amicus
Curiae on Behalf of Respondents Urging Denial of Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 4.
This provision may profitably be compared with the Constitution of the United

Presbyterian Church in the United States of America:
Whenever hereafter a particular church is formally dissolved by the
presbytery, or has become extinct by reason of the dispersal of its

members, the abandonment of its work, or other cause, such property as
it may have . . . shall be held . . . and applied for such uses . . . as

the presbytery may direct, limit, and appoint, or such property may be
sold or disposed of as the presbytery may direct, in conformance of the
Constitution of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America.
UNr
PRESBYERAN CHURcH IN THE UNTED STATEs OF AMERICA, I1 BOOK OF
ORDER § 62.11 (1967).

203 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 606.
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Despite its strong endorsement of "neutral principles of law,"
the Supreme Court indicated nonetheless in its instructions on
remand that this approach to the resolution of church-property
disputes represents merely an optional, not a required, mode of
decision. Apparently, civil courts are free, alternatively, to avoid
an inquiry into the parties' actual intent and to decide churchproperty disputes instead on the basis of the Watson v. Jones fiction
of an implied consent by associated churches to the authority of the
general church. 2°4 As the Court in Jones v. Wolf appeared to
recognize, this implied-consent principle in effect constitutes "a
rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving
church disputes." 205 Even when the authority over the local
church's property is disputed, it seems, civil courts using this approach must defer to and enforce the decisions of the highest body
within the hierarchy.
A. The Continuing Force of Watson v. Jones
Justice Miller's statement of the implied-consent principle in
Watson v. Jones 206 was merely dictum and, although sometimes
cited, it has never been the subject of a Supreme Court holding.
The doctrine of implied consent was not necessary to the Court's
decision in Watson because it was undisputed that the local church
had submitted its property to the general church's control. Nevertheless, a number of state courts have felt bound by Watson's
prescription of implied consent, apparently out of a desire to avoid
judicial intrusion into the affairs of religious associations. 207
Mills v. Baldwin,2 08 a recent decision of the Florida Supreme
Court, presents an excellent case in point. Under circumstances
virtually identical to those at issue in Jones v. Wolf, the Florida
court reached a result opposite to that arrived at by the Georgia
courts. The "true issue" 209 in Mills, according to the Florida court,
20

4 In Watson the Court simply assumed that local church groups associated
with hierarchical religious organizations thereby consent to be governed exclusively,
and without any interference whatsoever by the state, by the hierarchy's authorities.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). See note 49 supra &
accompanying text.

20- Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605.
206 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). See notes 49 & 204 supra & accompanying text.
2 07
See note 115 supra.
208344 So. 2d 259 (Fla. App. 1977), rev'd, 362 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 443 U.S. 914 (1979). The state court decision was vacated
and remanded by the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Jones
v. Wolf.
.209 362 So. 2d at 7.
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was which of two factions represented the local church. The court
found that "authority to identify the local church [resided] in the
hierarchy" 21o solely because the local congregation was associated
with the hierarchical organization. To the Florida Supreme Court,
the finding by the intermediate appellate court that "no understanding affecting property" ever existed between the two religious
bodies "ignored the character of the commitment" 211 made by
the local church when it affiliated with the general church. "That
commitment," in the view of the Florida Supreme Court, "was
total and without reservation": 212
In the absence of a specific understanding or agreement
preserving a separate entity and expressing an intention
to withhold its property we think it must be presumed
that by voluntarily merging itself as an organ of the larger
body, it intended to dedicate its all to the purposes of that
213
body.
Any other approach, the Florida court concluded, would "depart
from the well-established rule of Watson v. Jones."2 14

Other state courts, like Georgia's, have rejected such a presumption of consent in favor of an inquiry, under "neutral principles of law," into the nature of the association between the contesting religious groups.2 15 Desirous of accomplishing Watson's
professed goal of providing protection to religious groups equivalent to that enjoyed by other voluntary associations, these courts
have attempted to adjudicate such controversies by discerning and
enforcing the actual intentions of the parties.
As a practical matter, therefore, Jones v. Wolf is likely to promote greater uncertainty and confusion among state courts concerning the permissible forms and limits of judicial intervention
in church-property disputes. By tempering its strong endorsement
of "neutral principles of law" with an apparent, albeit less enthusiastic, approval of Watson's fiction of implied consent, the
210 344 So. 2d at 268 (Smith, J.,
dissenting). The Florida Supreme Court
explicitly "subscribe[d] to the reasoning and conclusion of Judge Smith's dissent
below" and claimed that "it would be of little benefit to restate what was so ably
put by him." 362 So. 2d at 5.
211344 So. 2d at 269 (Smith, J., dissenting).
212

Id.

213 Id. (quoting Reformed Bethanian Church v. Ochsner, 72 S.D. 150, 159-60,

31 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1948) (emphasis added)).
214 344 So. 2d at 269.
215 See note 116 supra.
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Supreme Court offered limited guidance to civil courts deliberating
between these two approaches. "Courts trying to be fair and unbiased," as one student commented after the Presbyterian Church
decision, will continue to "face great perplexity in trying to decide
what the Supreme Court really meant and which of the available
rules they should apply." 2 16
Moreover, the inclusion of contradictory doctrines in Jones
v. Wolf may allow certain state courts the opportunity "to choose
arbitrarily between the Watson rule and neutral principles with
apparent justification depending upon which litigant or which
rule they prefer." 217 State courts willing to inject their own preferences regarding church polity often will be able, in the absence of
an express provision regarding church property, to adopt the presumption reflecting their own predilections. Furthermore, the

Court's opinion appears to dash any hope that may have existed
for a definitive and uniform rule of decision. National and local
churches alike continue to face the prospect of conflicting results
depending upon the state of adjudication.

The most serious consequence of the Court's opinion lies,
however, not in its effects upon state law but, as the dissent suggests, in the fact that "important issues of federal constitutional
law thus are left to the state courts for their decision." 218 For
churches, no less than individuals, may "stake out some very elementary and basic claims to freedom under the First Amendment." 219 By failing to address the first amendment implications
of the doctrine of implied consent, the Court in Jones v. Wolf left
the state courts to trace a constitutional course at least poorly
220
mapped, if not, as the dissent claims, "totally uncharted."
B. The ConstitutionalNecessity of Neutral Principles
The Supreme Court's choice in Watson v. Jones between judicial intervention or deference to the church tribunal depended
on an inquiry into church polity. Mr. Justice Miller intended that
churches should stand before the law precisely as would other
forms of voluntary association, subject in the same manner and to
the same extent to civil authority.22 ' The Court thus attempted to
216 The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAv. L. REv. 7, 133 (1969).

217 Id.
218 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 616 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2
19 Kauper, supra note 9, at 376.
220 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 616 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2 21

See note 48 supra & accompanying text. See generally Chafee, supra note
193; Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HA-v. L. REv. 201 (1937); De-
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promote the policies embodied in the religion clauses by strictly
protecting the principle of freedom of association. Such freedom
not only permits but requires that parties be free to determine
the limits and purposes of their relationship. Under this approach,
whatever authority a hierarchical organization may have over associated local churches is derived solely from the local churches'
consent.
If a general church's hierarchical authority over a local church
and its property is undisputed, as it was in Watson v. Jones, civil
courts must settle the conflict by discerning and enforcing the
decision of the highest church authority. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral222 and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,223 for example, both represent applications of Watson's deference principle. Judicial deference to the decision reached by the
appropriate hierarchical tribunal was premised in each case on the
fact of the local church's consent, either express or implicit, to be
governed by the hierarchy's resolution of the matter. Inasmuch as
such deference merely reflected the local church's intention and
consent to adhere to the determinations reached by the ruling
hierarchy, it constituted a "neutral principle of law." Application
of the deference approach presupposes, however, that the religious
body with ultimate authority to prescribe the use of the church
property can be identified.
In certain circumstances, the task of ascertaining the intention
of associated church groups respecting ownership and control over
church property will be far from easy. Yet, the prospect of difficulty in discovering the intentions of the parties cannot justify
judicial refusal to resolve controversies between churches over
property or contracts. As Mr. Justice Miller noted in Watson, religious organizations, like all voluntary associations, "are equally
under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members
subject to [the same] restraints." 224 Indeed, refusal to adjudicate a
dispute over property rights or contractual obligations simply because the litigants are religious organizations "smacks of a denial of
equal protection as well as a violation of first amendment rights."

225

When a local church claims to have surrendered neither its autonomy nor its right to use church property, yet alleges usurpation
velopments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
HARv. L. 11Ev. 983 (1963).
222 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
See notes 64-69 supra & accompanying text.
223426 U.S. 696 (1976).
See notes 87-110 supra & accompanying text.
224 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1871).
225 Casad, supra note 48, at 432.
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by the hierarchy, it must have recourse to an impartial body to
resolve its claims. The presumption that, by entering into an
association with the hierarchical organization, a local church
thereby gives up to the hierarchy autonomous control over its property, in effect begs this central question. As a result, the rule of
compulsory deference, in conjunction with implied consent, denies
to local churches the same protection of law afforded to other
voluntary associations.
Judicial adherence to Watson's prescription of implied consent
has been grounded in a desire to further religious liberty through
the separation of church and state. Constrained by the misleading
metaphor of a "wall of separation" in church-state relations, some
civil courts, reluctant to participate in disputes involving churches,
have in professed compliance with the dictates of the religion
clauses avoided inquiry into the nature of the parties' actual agreement. But the issue of judicial intervention into church disputes
is not one of defining separate spheres within which churches and
states respectively should operate. Rather, it is to develop standards that will assure all religious groups the equality of treatment
that the first amendment requires.
Tying control of a local church to a hierarchical organization,
regardless whether the local church in fact has relinquished control,
effectively limits the ability of local church congregations to establish the terms of their association with more general church organizations. Moreover, local churches desirous of associating with
a hierarchical organization for purposes of religious worship may be
inhibited from such association by a well-founded fear of losing
their property. The assumption that a local church has consented,
at least in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, to
another religious group's authority over its property imposes additional legal requirements on local churches that may constrain
their right to associate with other religious groups. In this manner,
adherence by state courts to the implied-consent theory may constitute a violation of the free exercise clause.
At the same time, by encouraging and supporting a hierarchical
form of church polity over other alternative forms, adoption of
Watson's fiction of implied consent would appear to constitute a
judicial establishment of religion. No less than tangible state financial assistance, judicial support of one institutional form of church
polity over another is prohibited by the first amendment. 226 In
our view, local churches that lose control over their property, on
226

See id. 420-27.
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the basis of a judicial presumption that they relinquished control to
a hierarchical society, may claim that such judicial action not only
violates their rights under the free exercise provision, but also
constitutes a breach of the establishment clause. When faced with
two competing religious groups, each of which claims the right to
control certain property, civil courts must not be allowed to presume in favor of one side or the other; rather, they should be required to determine which religious society in fact retains legal
ownership of the property. The only approach that is both consistent with the strictures of the free exercise and the establishment
clauses, as well as with the premise-apparently accepted by all
members of the Court in Jones v. Wolf-that judicial resolution of
church-property disputes should reflect the intentions of the parties,
is one that remains strictly neutral between the parties.
CONCLUSION

The application of "neutral principles of law" respects the
right of a church body to affiliate for some reasons, agreeing to abide
by certain conditions, yet refusing to become associated for other
purposes. Moreover, it recognizes that different kinds of affiliations exist among religious groups according to the institutional
arrangements agreed upon by their members. Unlike the impliedconsent approach, "neutral principles of law" embody no preference
among these various organizational possibilities, nor do they impose
on any church particular legal requirements that might inhibit
the formation of religious associations. And, because neutral principles are not result-oriented, the outcome of a church-property
227
dispute is not foreordained.
Neutral-principles analysis is premised on the fact that, prior
to the association between the competing churches, control of the
property rested indisputably with one of the parties. From that
premise, a court then should proceed to examine all relevant evidence for indications whether this control has "ever been surrendered or lost, either by cession of the property to another group,
or by relinquishment of control over the property by other legally
cognizable means." 228 The only restriction on this inquiry is
that courts confine themselves within the strictures of the religion
clauses by avoiding the interpretation or evaluation of matters of
ecclesiastical doctrine or practice.
22 7

Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 608.
Note, supra note 1, at 1135.

228 YA. E
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Application of neutral principles will not prevent courts from
finding the creation of a trust of church property in favor of a
religious organization when the circumstances dictate. 229
But
neither will this approach presume the existence of such a trust
in the absence of an indication that the local church intended,
either expressly or by implication, to submit its property to the
control of a separate religious body. Judicial adherence to this
mode of decision, therefore, would not only recognize the freedom
of churches to determine the limits and purposes of their association, but would also encourage them to comply with their obligation to "structure relationships involving church property so as
not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions." 230
At any time before a church dispute erupts, the parties can ensure,
if they so choose, that the hierarchical body or a faction loyal to it
will retain the church property, simply by expressing that intention
clearly. Thus, as the Court in Jones v. Wolf concluded, "the
promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be
occasional problems in application." 231 What is more important,
the resulting resolution of church disputes by this method would
avoid using religion "as a standard for action or inaction . . .
either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden" 232 and thus
assure all church groups the equality of treatment that the first
amendment requires.
229

In Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976), for example, the case in which the Georgia Supreme Court first endorsed
the application of neutral principles, the local church's claim of autonomy was rejected on the basis of provisions dealing with church property and control in the
United Methodist Church's Discipline. These provisions clearly showed the parties'
intention that the local church should hold the property in the general church's
behalf. Subsequently, in Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330
(1979), the Georgia Supreme Court again found a trust of local church property
for the benefit of the general church on the basis of the Disciplinary Rules of the
Holiness Baptist Association, which provided in part that the Association "shall
hold all church property, regardless if all members vote to change the church to
some other faith." 243 Ga. at 344, 254 S.E.2d at 332. Because the local church
had participated in making the rule and did not contest its validity for thirty years,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that it could not "now deny the existence of a
trust for the benefit of the general church." 243 Ga. at 345, 254 S.E.2d at 332.
23oPresbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969), quoted in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604.
2

31 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604.

232

Kurland, supra note 31, at 24 (quoting P.
112 (1962)).
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